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Governments of countries in political transition after a period of severe vio-
lence, such as a repressive dictatorship or a civil war, have to make important 
decisions about how to deal with the violent events of the past. The form of 
justice associated with these periods of political change is called transitional 
justice (Teitel, 2003). Since the 1980s, truth commissions have been a popular 
mechanism in these contexts.   A truth commission can be defined as:
[…] an ad hoc, autonomous, and victim-centered commission of inquiry set up in 
and authorized by a state for the primary purpose of (1) investigating and reporting 
on the principal causes and consequences of broad and relatively recent patterns of 
severe violence or repression that occurred in the state during determinate periods 
of abusive rule or conflict, and (2) making recommendations for their redress and 
future prevention. (Freeman, 2006: 18)
Truth commissions play an important role in a country’s transitional justice 
process (e.g. Bakiner, 2016; Brahm, 2007). Therefore, the selection of 
members of the commission – hereafter commissioners – is a crucial deci-
sion. Commissioners of truth commissions seem to have notably divergent 
professions and backgrounds. Some of the professions are rather surprising, 
e.g. physician/author, cardiologist, engineer and philosopher in the case of the 
truth commission of Argentina. This observation raises the question of why 
particular commissioners are selected.1
This question is sometimes (briefly) answered as part of a broader discussion 
of a particular truth commission (e.g. Crenzel, 2012 on Argentina; Kritz, 1995 
on Chile). The comparative literature on the topic, such as Freeman (2006) and 
Hayner (2011) who both discuss some contrasting cases with respect to differ-
ent selection procedures, has an overall descriptive character. Other analyses 
have a more normative character and formulate specific recommendations for 
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the selection of the commissioners (e.g. Amnesty International, 2007; Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2006). 
In this chapter I wish to go further than the existing scholarship and in 
doing so I am interested in the broader question of whether we can detect 
an epistemic profile of commissioners of truth commissions in general. My 
approach contains both descriptive and normative elements, however, clearly 
different from the examples given above. Through a comparative-conceptual 
analysis comparing different truth commissions as well as different forms of 
commissions mainly focusing on the concepts of objectivity and representiv-
ity, I arrive at an epistemic profile of commissioners of truth commissions. 
An epistemic profile, in the way that I use it here, describes aspects related 
to the agents’ knowledge, their knowledge production and the way they pass 
knowledge on to others. The profile in this chapter is descriptive, but also 
has normative implications. This epistemic profile does not prescribe binding 
selection criteria for the commissioners, but rather it is normative in the sense 
that it indicates the importance of certain concepts and ideas that policymakers 
should take into account when composing a truth commission. It can offer 
us a better understanding of the often only implicit ideas and values at play 
related to the selection of truth commissioners, independent of the particular 
political context.
For this chapter I draw on the work of Ashforth in his article ‘Reckoning 
Schemes of Legitimation: On Commissions of Inquiry as Power/Knowledge 
Forms’ (1990). The article does not specifically discuss truth commissions, but 
commissions of inquiry in general. Based on his findings, Ashforth states that 
there are two basic types of criteria generally considered by governments when 
deciding membership of a commission of inquiry: representativeness of par-
ticular sectoral interests and expertise (Ashforth, 1990). Ashforth furthermore 
discusses three sources from which a commission’s authority is derived. First, 
the authority of the high-level political authorities that select a commission 
gives this new commission credibility and authority. Second, commissions 
have authority because of the status and expertise of their members and, third, 
the supposedly rational, impartial, objective and independent procedures give 
authority to the commission’s findings (ibid.). Both topics, the required char-
acteristics of the commissioners and the commission’s authority, are addressed 
in this chapter. However, in the epistemic profile I develop, I will propose 
other characteristics for the commissioners of truth commissions, and I will 
suggest another source for the commission’s authority, that of the composition 
of the overall commission.
The cases of Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and South Africa will serve 
as the basis of my analysis. I will start this chapter with a brief presentation 
of these truth commissions, especially focusing on the aspects related to the 
selection of the commissioners. Drawing on Ashforth’s (1990) work as out-
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lined above, I then explore how the different compositions of the selected truth 
commissions can be interpreted according to different ideals of objectivity. 
The composition of these truth commission can be seen as an additional source 
of authority for both the commissions and its results.
In the second part of this chapter, I examine what kind of representative role 
commissioners are expected and supposed to play. In order to do so, I first 
consider two comparable but contrasting bodies: the expert commissions 
of the European Commission (hereafter EC) and the jury of an assize court. 
These two can be placed at two extremes of a continuum: the members of 
an expert commission can be called subject matter experts, whereas jurors 
are both laypeople (non-experts) and peers. A comparison between these 
commissions and truth commissions indicates that the commissioners of 
a truth commission occupy a place somewhere in between these two extremes. 
A member of a truth commission should ideally represent all of the victims, 
the parties involved and society at large, a requirement that neither the subject 
matter expert nor the layman-peer seem able to meet. I then proceed with an 
overall comparison of the backgrounds and professions of commissioners 
which leads, in combination with the analysis in the first part of the chapter, 
to a general, epistemic profile of the commissioners of the selected cases. In 
contrast to Ashforth, I state that the commissioners do not necessarily need 
to be subject matter experts. Their epistemic profile exists in having a good 
status, possessing the necessary intellectual and research capacities and being 
able to represent certain groups, in direct or indirect ways. It is important to 
highlight that the epistemic profile alone is not enough. The commissioners 
can never fulfil their tasks in a completely objective way, in the sense of being 
value-free. That is why not only the profile of the commissioner but also the 
composition of the commission is crucial.
BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE SELECTED CASES
In this section, I will outline the characteristics of the truth commissions of 
Argentina (1983–4), Chile (1990–1), El Salvador (1992–3) and South Africa 
(1995–2002), with a focus on the aspects relevant for the selection of the 
commissioners. These truth commissions were selected because of the relevant 
differences in the selection procedures of the commissioners and the final 
composition of the commissions. As can be seen below there is some variety in 
how the commissions were conceived, their mandates and purpose, as well as 
any specifications regarding the selection of commissioners. However, all four 
cases share some important similarities. They represent some of the earliest, 
most defining examples of truth commissions that contributed considerably to 
shaping not only how later truth commissions were conceptualized and shaped, 
but they also defined the field of transitional justice beyond criminal justice 
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(Bell, 2009) both as an academic enquiry and a practice for decades to come. 
While all four commissions differ in how their commissioners were selected, 
they all sought to learn from and support each other as they shaped their 
transitions. This exchange most notably took place at a series of conferences 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s at which key figures from all four contexts 
were present (Mouralis, 2013). They can thus be presumed to have influenced 
each other. Members of the South African Commission then went on to shape 
transitional justice processes elsewhere, most notably through the founding of 
the International Center for Transitional Justice by the Deputy Chairperson 
of the South African TRC Alex Boraine and the truth commission scholar 
Priscilla Hayner (Vinjamuri and Snyder, 2004). Their importance in shaping 
both truth commissions and transitional justice more broadly makes them 
crucial cases for the analysis of the selection processes of the commissioners 
of truth commissions. 
The Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (National 
Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, hereafter CONADEP) was 
established in 1984 by president Raúl Alfonsin by means of Presidential 
Decree no. 187/83. The objective of the commission was to investigate what 
had happened during the recent Argentine military dictatorship (1976–83). 
The presidential decree appointed the first ten members of the commission 
(CONADEP, 1984: part IV). It was originally intended that both Chambers of 
Congress would each select three additional members, but only the Chamber 
of Deputies did so. As a result, the commission consisted of 13 members in 
total (CONADEP, 1984: cap. 4.I; Hayner, 1994; Presidential Decree 187/83, 
Art. 7). 
The Chilean Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación (Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission) was created in 1990 by president Patricio Aylwin 
to investigate the human rights violations which occurred during the Chilean 
dictatorship of Pinochet (1973–90).2 The president selected the eight com-
missioners of the commission based on their human rights background, their 
prestige and authority. He personally invited people with different political 
affiliations to avoid (the impression of) political bias (Kritz, 1995; Supreme 
Decree 355: Art. 8).
The Salvadoran commission (Comisión de la Verdad para El Salvador) 
was established as part of the United Nations (UN) guided peace agreements 
between the Salvadoran government and the Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrilla movement, in order to put an end to the 
civil war (1979–90s). Under the Mexico Agreements of April 1991, both 
parties accepted the UN proposal to create a truth commission (Doggett and 
Kircher, 2005). Following long discussions, the parties agreed to establish 
a commission composed of foreigners, while the planned ad hoc commission3 
would be composed of nationals (Americas Watch, 1993; Jowdy, 1997). The 
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commission’s mandate prescribed that the three members of the commission 
should be appointed by the UN Secretary-General, with input from the parties 
involved.
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was 
established in 1995 by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act, in order to investigate the human rights violations committed during the 
Apartheid regime (1948–91). The following official instructions were given 
under the Act regarding the appointment of the commissioners:
The commission shall consist of not fewer than 11 and not more than 17 commis-
sioners, as may be determined by the president in consultation with the cabinet. 
(a) The president shall appoint the commissioners in consultation with the cabinet.
(b) The commissioners shall be fit and proper persons who are impartial and who 
do not have a high political profile: provided that not more than two persons 
who are not South African citizens may be appointed as commissioners. 
(Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995: Art. 7)
The Act only prescribed that the members of the commission should be 
appointed by the president in consultation with the cabinet, but the final selec-
tion process was more inclusive. During the first phase, the public was invited 
to send in nominations, which resulted in a first list of 299 candidates. Then, 
a special committee consisting of members of parliament and people from 
the non-governmental organization (NGO) community made a first selection 
and invited them for public hearings. After the hearings, a final list of 25 can-
didates was compiled and passed on to the president. During the final phase, 
President Mandela selected 15 members from this list in consultation with his 
cabinet and with the heads of the political parties. The president also added 
two extra members to make the commission more representative of South 
African society (Shea, 2000; Verdoolaege, 2005). The final commission thus 
counted 17 members4 and contained commissioners of each of the apartheid’s 
race categories, of the full range of political backgrounds (from the left to the 
conservative, white right wing) and of different religious beliefs (Christian, 
Muslim, Hindu and agnostic) (Tutu, 1999; Verdoolaege, 2005).
THE COMPOSITION OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS
In her article ‘The Practices of Objectivity in Regulatory Science’ (2011), 
Sheila Jasanoff investigates how policy-relevant knowledge of investigative 
and advisory commissions gains authority. Comparable to those commis-
sions, truth commissions also generate policy-relevant knowledge. To have 
political impact, authority is important for all three kinds of commissions. 
Jasanoff argues that the authority of investigative and advisory commissions 
rests on their objectivity. Demonstrations of objectivity can protect the com-
Dietlinde Wouters - 9781789905359
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 02/24/2021 09:11:29AM
via free access
Knowledge for peace150
mission from suspicion of arbitrariness or self-interest. She further explains 
that different countries may have different styles of epistemic legitimation 
to constitute the objectivity of the commissions and of the knowledge they 
produce (Jasanoff, 2011). She compares three countries (the United States 
(US), Great Britain and Germany) in this respect and differentiates between 
two main approaches, namely the view from nowhere5 (US) and the view from 
everywhere (Great Britain and Germany). I will argue that the authority of 
truth commissions also depends on often implicit objectivity claims and we 
can identify different ways of constituting objectivity. Below, I briefly present 
the American, British and German approaches discussed in Jasanoff’s article 
and then show how this analysis applies to the selected truth commissions.
The view from nowhere, used to describe the American approach, is an 
approach to claims-making ‘by ostensibly detaching knowledge from poten-
tially biased standpoints and from the distortions that any perspective or view-
point necessarily entails’ (ibid.: 309). In the American context of science-based 
regulation, policymakers adhere to the idea that facts speak for themselves and 
that scientific advice can be impartial. The personal aspects of knowledge pro-
ducers, such as their personalities, personal opinions or viewpoints, should not 
have any effect on their knowledge production and even become irrelevant if 
they do their job correctly. US policymakers minimize the effects that agency, 
subjectivity and human decision-making might have. Instead they promote 
strategies of depersonalization and present their decisions as based solely on 
scientific evidence (ibid.: 312–313). 
The view from everywhere approach, on the other hand, assumes that deci-
sions cannot be made free from all values, but rather should be taken from 
a position that is balanced or neutral with respect to a spectrum of views and 
values. In the UK, elite figures are asked to form part of investigative and 
advisory commissions. This decision is not only taken because of their social 
status, but also because they are supposed to ‘articulate a plain, common-sense 
vision: knowledge whose truthfulness anyone in society, from the highest 
to the lowest, can in theory review and attest to’ (ibid.: 313) The results of 
such a commission are said to be objective, because they emerge from a truly 
communal view, a view from everywhere (ibid.). The same expression, a view 
from everywhere, circumscribes the kind of objectivity pursued in the German 
context of policy-relevant knowledge production. However, its implemen-
tation is different. In Germany, expert bodies produce common knowledge 
through a process of group reasoning in which ideally all the involved parties 
are represented. The validity of the expert consensus depends on the inclusion 
of all standpoints. If not all standpoints are represented, this has a negative 
impact on the objectivity of the results (ibid.: 314).
Truth commissions are also intended to produce objective knowledge. 
The different ways of attempting to achieve this aim can be mapped onto the 
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objectivity ideals that seem to have been pursued during the selection of com-
missioners for the truth commissions described above. The American form of 
objectivity, which uses strategies of depersonalization and focuses mainly on 
scientific evidence, is similar to how the Salvadoran commission was organ-
ized, as revealed by two of its main characteristics. First, the commission con-
sisted only of foreign members. This was a way of creating distance between 
the commissioners and the subject of investigation and between the commis-
sioners and Salvadoran society. According to the FMLN guerilla movement, 
a commission of Salvadorans would conduct the investigation in a less rigor-
ous way because of political pressure and fear of violence (Americas Watch, 
1993; Jowdy, 1997). Second, the Salvadoran commission also put a remark-
ably strong emphasis on rigorous and reliable methodology. They decided to 
submit all the information gathered to a strict reliability test. Information had 
to be verified, proven and re-examined before it was accepted as a reliable fact6 
(United Nations, 1993). Consequently, attention was shifted away from the 
personalities and the backgrounds of the commissioners, helping to constitute 
a view from nowhere from which objective knowledge can be produced.
The commissions of Argentina, Chile and South Africa were established 
according to the idea of objectivity as a view from everywhere. In Argentina, 
the president invited people ‘who enjoyed national and international pres-
tige, chosen for their consistent stance in defense of human rights and their 
representation of different walks of life’ (CONADEP, 1984: part IV). The 
CONADEP was a commission of notables. The focus on prestige and the fact 
that representivity was not a necessary condition fit in with the British idea 
of objectivity in which elite figures are asked to form part of a commission. 
The Chilean and South African commissions, on the other hand, tended to 
follow the German version of the view from everywhere with representation 
of the full social spectrum of views being central to the composition of these 
commissions. However, it is probably more accurate to speak of a mixed view 
in these cases, in which different objectivity ideals coexist. There was not 
only a focus on representivity but also on members having, as in the British 
approach to objectivity, a certain prestige and authority. The Chilean president 
selected and personally invited the eight commissioners of the Chilean truth 
commission, based on their human rights background, and their prestige and 
authority (Supreme Decree 355: Art. 8; Kritz, 1995). At the same time, he tried 
to include commissioners with different political affiliations to avoid political 
bias (Kritz, 1995). The selection procedure of the members of the South 
African TRC was a democratic and open process resulting in a commission 
of well-known members. The final decision was made by President Mandela 
who explicitly emphasized the importance of representivity. He added two 
extra members who had not been on the list of the selection committee, in 
order to make the commission more representative of South African society 
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(Verdoolaege, 2005). In contrast to the Chilean commission, representation 
and representivity were not only interpreted in respect to the members’ politi-
cal affiliations. The TRC also contained members of each of the apartheid race 
categories and members with different religious beliefs (Christian, Muslim, 
Hindu, agnosticism).
REPRESENTIVITY IN TRUTH COMMISSIONS
A Spectrum of Representation
For the view from everywhere, representation is a crucial concept. Political 
representation generally exhibits the five following components: 
Some party that is representing (the representative, an organization, movement, 
state agency, etc.);
Some party that is being represented (the constituents, the clients, etc.);
Something that is being represented (opinions, perspectives, interests, discourses, 
etc.); 
A setting within which the activity of representation is taking place (the political 
context); and
Something that is being left out (the opinions, interests, and perspectives not 
voiced). (Dovi, 2017: section 1)
I will show that these components provide a useful framework for discussing 
representation in the context of truth commissions’ work as well.
For the German form of the view from everywhere, representivity, in 
other words how representative a commission is for the group it represents, 
is very important. To know whether a (political) representation can be called 
representative, the question should be answered as to whether the party that 
is representing (component 1) represents the opinions, perspectives, interests, 
discourses, etc. (component 3) of the party that is being represented (compo-
nent 2) in an adequate way, preferably in as complete a way as possible. When 
the opinion, interests or perspectives of a relevant group of people are not rep-
resented, the representation cannot be called representative. Representations 
can be more or less representative. Reflection about the first four components 
reveal information about the fifth component and, hence, about the extent of 
representivity of the representation. 
Representation plays an important role in truth commissions, but also in 
other kinds of commissions. The meaning of the concept may vary for different 
(kinds of) commissions. I will briefly explore two specific kinds of commis-
sions where representation plays a prominent role: the expert commissions of 
the EC and the jury of the Belgian Assize court (Hof van Assisen).7 An expert 
commission is a consultative body which is set up by the EC or its depart-
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ments when external specialist advice is needed for policymaking, often about 
specific and very technical topics (e.g. climate change policy and artificial 
intelligence) (EC, 2016). The EC in need of external specialist advice is the 
setting within which representation in the commission takes place (component 
4). Given the objective of the expert commission, it should represent the most 
recent knowledge available from those with the greatest expertise in the field 
(components 2 and 3). A commission appropriate to represent these experts 
and this knowledge should therefore be a commission composed of a selection 
of these experts (component 1). They can be called subject matter experts.8 
The official information on the selection of the commissioners on the website 
of the EC confirms this profile.9
A completely different kind of representation and representivity is applied 
in the context of the jurors of the Belgian assize court (component 4). The 
principle behind the existence of the jury in the Assize court is the right of 
the public to participate in the administration of justice (Traest, 2001). It is 
therefore the opinion of the public that should be represented by the jury 
(components 2 and 3). In other words, the jury is supposed to offer a view 
from everywhere. The public is represented by people who are both laypeople 
and peers of the public (component 1). Peers can be defined as people who are 
members of the same social set.10 Jurors are selected by drawing lots from the 
most recent list of juror candidates based on the voters’ register.11 This selec-
tion procedure results in a list of random citizens. They are therefore peers of 
all citizens and hence of the whole of society (ibid.).12 The jurors of the Assize 
court are also called laypeople or lay judges (for example in Traest, 2001). 
A layperson is a non-expert in relation to some particular profession or branch 
of knowledge (Oxford English Dictionary). In contrast to professional judges, 
jurors do not have the same relevant knowledge, education or experience. In 
fact, people holding legislative, political, judicial or governmental offices are 
eliminated from the juror candidates’ list13 (component 5) (Art. 218, Law of 
December 21, 2009). 
The task of the Assize court is to reveal the truth about a crime and to 
decide on the guilt of the accused. But why would we prefer the judgment of 
the lay jury over the judgment of professional judges who can be presumed to 
be the experts in this context? In comparison with other courts, at least three 
interesting advantages stand out. First of all, the involvement of lay judges is 
said to provide a better or at least a different kind of judgment. Jury members 
‘appreciate the moral aspect of the facts in a broader and more human way than 
professional judges’ (Traest, 2001: 46). Second, the jury represents different 
views, while a professional judge only presents his own view. In addition, 
the jury decision process is a clearly collective process. The jurors deliberate 
together before they vote on the question of guilt. Third, the public seems to 
put more trust in the judgment of the jury and accept their decision more easily 
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than that of a professional judge. The verdict of the jury is said to represent 
public opinion because their members are the public’s peers (Duquenne, 
2015). Hence, the fact that the case is decided upon by a jury has a positive 
effect on the general credibility of and trust in its outcome.
So, the expert commissions of the EC and the jury of an assize court can 
be placed at two extremes of a continuum: the members of an expert commis-
sion can be called subject matter experts, whereas jurors are both laypeople 
(non-experts) and peers. A comparison between these commissions and truth 
commissions will indicate that the commissioners of a truth commission 
occupy a place somewhere in between these two extremes.
Representation in Truth Commissions
The components used to understand how representation works at the expert 
commission and the jury also help to analyse the practice of truth commis-
sions. The setting of truth commissions (component 4) is the highly political 
and complex context of a state after a violent period. By organizing the truth 
commission, the new government seeks to establish a rupture with the vio-
lence of the past. The commissions also often initiate or support the national 
reconciliation process (Hayner, 1994, 1996). Truth commissions are thus often 
victim-centred, which means that giving a voice to victims is a crucial part of 
their approach (Freeman, 2006) and their representation is an important aspect. 
One of the objectives of a truth commission is to compile a report about occur-
rences during the violent period, ideally one that will be accepted by all parties 
involved and by society at large. Ideally, therefore, the commission should rep-
resent the victims, all the parties involved and the whole society (components 
2 and 3). As a consequence, the following questions arise: Who are the people 
appropriate to represent these groups? What does representation mean here?
Experts or laypeople?
As explained above, the expert commission (subject matter experts) and the 
jury of the Assize court (both laypeople and peers) can be seen as two extremes 
on a continuum. Where exactly on the continuum can we find the members of 
a truth commission? In comparison with the members of the expert commis-
sion, the commissioners of a truth commission clearly have a different profile. 
To start with, it is more difficult to identify an expert in the context of a truth 
commission. When the EC looks for members of an expert commission on 
a specific topic, for example artificial intelligence, it might not be easy to 
select the best experts in the field, but the kind of expertise they expect from 
the expert is quite clear. People are chosen to form part of such an expert 
commission for the specific knowledge they possess on a certain topic. The 
objective of the commission is to write a report in which the expert knowledge 
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of all its members is included. Such a report informs policymakers on the 
latest developments and the most recent knowledge on the topic. In a truth 
commission, the expertise and the knowledge of the commissioners alone are 
not sufficient. Once the commission is formed, the commissioners have to start 
their investigation and gather relevant information from other sources. Only in 
a later phase are they able to decide what information to include in the report.
We can say that, although the commissioners of truth commissions might 
have knowledge about the violent past of the country, they do not necessarily 
have to be experts whose (factual) knowledge will directly serve the report 
writing. They might know a lot about the conflict, but it is not this knowledge 
(alone) that will end up in the report. Interestingly, in some truth commissions, 
the organizers even try to avoid the inclusion of experts who might already 
have a strong opinion on what happened. For example, Charles Villa-Vicencio 
(national research director of the TRC) and Wilhelm Verwoerd (researcher 
within the TRC) explained that in the South African transitional context the 
decision was taken to not opt for a ‘typical, “elitist” commission of experts 
attempting to produce an authoritative version of the truth’ (Villa-Vicencio 
and Verwoerd, 2000: 289). Instead, they sought ‘to implement and manage an 
inclusive, accessible, and transparent process in order to facilitate a pluralistic 
public account, generated by diverse individuals “telling their own stories” 
and a variety of individuals and institutions making submissions’ (ibid.: 289). 
In El Salvador it was decided that the commissioners and their staff would 
all be foreigners. Although they certainly had expertise in other fields, as 
non-nationals they clearly had less knowledge of the situation in El Salvador 
than many Salvadorans at that time. Before they were able to decide which 
cases to investigate, they had to start with a phase of general fact-finding, 
in order to achieve a better understanding of the extent and the scope of the 
violence (Buergenthal, 1995). These examples show that the commissioners of 
a truth commission are, in some aspects, a kind of laypeople: at the beginning 
of the process they do not necessarily know more about the conflict than other 
laypeople (i.e. the normal non-expert population); in some cases, they might 
even know less. They have no pre-defined, in-depth understandings of the 
conflict; therefore, they are not subject matter experts. Of course, that they can 
be seen as laypeople with regards to the conflict context does not mean that 
they have no expertise or qualities with regards to other relevant topics. This 
will be discussed in further detail below. 
The quote from Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd is particularly interesting. 
It suggests some relevant reasons for including laypeople instead of experts 
with a strong opinion. We cannot be sure that these reasons are valid for all 
cases, but experts appear to be excluded from truth commissions because their 
knowledge-forming process is not accessible, transparent or inclusive for 
a non-expert public. Because the experts have already formed their opinion on 
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the topic, this process is already (partially) completed when they start to work 
on the commission. Both the knowledge-forming process and the knowledge 
that result from it are therefore not accessible to or transparent for a non-expert 
public. Such a non-transparent way of communicating seems to suggest that 
the results are evident. The role of the members’ personal background, experi-
ences, beliefs and opinions is left unclear. In other words, such a commission 
seems to claim a view from nowhere. 
Peers?
The idea that the knowledge-forming process of a truth commission should be 
transparent and inclusive for a non-expert public points to the same advantages 
of lay judges in the Assize court, namely the importance of a good reception 
by society and the inclusion of different views (not only expert views). These 
seem to be the advantages that truth commissions are looking for as well. If 
we compare them with the lay judges of the Assize court, can it be argued that 
they, too, are peers? 
In contrast to the members of a jury, the commissioners of a truth com-
mission are not randomly selected peers. They are specifically selected. That 
they cannot be random peers becomes clear when comparing the tasks of the 
jury of the Assize court with those of the members of a truth commission. In 
the Assize court, the jurors do not have to do any research. Their main task 
is to take the available information and the arguments presented into account 
when they decide on the guilt and the punishment of the accused. The tasks 
of the commissioners of a truth commission are more extensive and complex. 
For example, the primary objective of the Chilean National Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was ‘to clarify the truth about the serious human 
rights violations that occurred between 11 September 1973 and 11 March 
1990’ (Supreme Decree 355 Chile, 1990). Furthermore, the truth commission 
was instructed to formulate recommendations for reparations and prevention. 
In the mandate of the Chilean Rettig Commission, two concrete functions 
were formulated. The first was ‘to establish a complete overview of the grave 
violations, their antecedents and their circumstances’; the second ‘to gather 
information that will contribute to identify the victims and information about 
their fate and whereabouts’ (Supreme Decree 355 Chile, 1990). The respon-
sibility of the truth commissions includes tasks such as doing research, taking 
testimony from witnesses, analysing data, reporting to the public and compos-
ing a complete report on the topic. The commissioners ideally possess certain 
characteristics and capabilities relevant for these tasks, including research 
skills, experience working with victims and perpetrators, or the effective com-
munication of complex, often highly moralized, issues to the public. 
The commissioners of truth commissions, therefore, are not experts like the 
members of the expert commission, nor peer-laypeople like the members of 
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the Jury of the Belgian Assize court. It can be argued that they occupy a place 
somewhere in between these two extremes. In the next section, I will examine 
what else is distinctive about them. 
WHO ARE THE COMMISSIONERS OF A TRUTH 
COMMISSION?
Comparison of Membership14
A comparative analysis of the commissioners in the truth commissions of 
Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and South Africa leads to some interesting 
observations about their backgrounds and profiles. There are some remarkable 
similarities. As discussed above, the commissioners are not subject matter 
experts with regards to the conflict, but they clearly possess other kinds of 
expertise and characteristics. First of all, many commissioners have worked 
in academia. This is especially true for the commissions of Argentina, Chile 
and El Salvador. In the CONADEP, the commissioners had academic back-
grounds in fields such as physics, engineering, philosophy, cardiology and 
mathematics. Many Chilean commissioners had an academic background, too, 
although they were mostly specialists in law, and one of the three members 
of the Salvadoran commission was also a law professor. Second, the commis-
sions included many people who were active in human rights defence. Some, 
such as lawyers, did so professionally. For example, Ricardo Colombres was 
a defence attorney for political prisoners and relatives of disappeared persons 
in Argentina. Other members were human rights activists, members of human 
rights organizations or had taken a personal (and often public) stance against 
human rights abuses. Third, many members have a legal background: at least 
one in each of the four truth commissions. In Chile seven out of eight commis-
sioners have a law degree. This commission had a clear legal focus. Although 
this major legal focus is remarkable, it was not one of the explicit criteria 
formulated in the supreme decree (Supreme Decree 355). In comparison, in the 
CONADEP the legal focus seems to be less important: the commission only 
contained one lawyer. Fourth, the commissions often contained members who 
could be expected to have the ability to explain complicated issues in a way 
understandable to a broad public, such as journalists, authors and politicians. 
Fifth, except for the commission of El Salvador, all the commissions contained 
either victims or people who could be seen as representatives of the victims. 
Several Chilean members had lived abroad in exile and several members of 
the South African commission had themselves been victims of human rights 
violations. The above-mentioned Ricardo Colombres is an example in the 
Argentinian case. Sixth, it would be true to say that all the commissioners had 
a good reputation and a degree of prestige. The legal decree which founded 
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the Chilean commission is explicit that commissioners should be people 
with nationally recognized prestige. The CONADEP’s report described the 
members of the commission in a similar way, as people who enjoy national 
and international prestige (CONADEP, 1984: chap 4.I). This explains why the 
commission contained, for instance, a famous author, the former rector of the 
University of Buenos Aires and a well-known cardiologist. In South Africa, 
the selection procedures of the commissioners had been a participative and 
democratic process that assured the prestige of the commissioners. The first 
phase of the procedure consisted in public nominations, which resulted in a list 
of well-known and respected people. Seventh, another apparently recurring 
characteristic of commissioners is ethical attitude and moral authority. Note 
that moral authority is not the same as good reputation and prestige. The latter 
refers to being well-known and respected, whereas moral authority is focused 
on the ability to take morally supported decisions or actions. People can have 
a good reputation or prestige for other reasons, for example because they 
are a good cardiologist. The condition of moral authority or a highly ethical 
attitude was clearly formulated in the Chilean decree. Although disputable, 
inviting people with a religious background (Argentina and South Africa) or 
judges (South Africa, El Salvador) can be interpreted in this way as well.
General Profile of the Commissioners
The comparison above suggests that the commissioners have some interest-
ing characteristics in common. Based on this comparison, I formulate here 
a general profile of the commissioners based on the analysed cases. This 
general profile helps us understand the selection of the members and refers 
to the notions of objectivity and representation discussed above. The profile 
can be described by highlighting three tendencies that are independent of the 
commissioner’s actual knowledge. 
First of all, the high status of the commissioners forms part of their profile. 
Certain recurring characteristics, such as prestige, good reputation and moral 
authority, are all related to the importance of high status. The fact that the status 
of members is important can be related to Jasanoff’s British model, where 
people of the elite are chosen to form part of the commission. Their presence 
contributes to a claim of objectivity. They can be said to present a view from 
everywhere. Their status has a positive influence on the authoritative character 
and overall acceptance of the knowledge they produce. 
Second, another important characteristic which forms part of the profile is 
that the commissioners possess the intellectual (research) capacities necessary 
to perform various complex tasks, such as taking testimony from witnesses, 
analysing data, reporting to other commissioners and to the public, conducting 
an investigation, fact checking and composing a complete report. This can be 
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expected from academics, lawyers and people who have previously worked in 
human rights defence. 
Third, the concept of representation plays an important role. However, 
representation here has a broad meaning. The fifth characteristic discussed in 
the section above requires that victims or representatives of the victims form 
part of the commission. We can speak here of direct representation. Direct rep-
resentation, in the way that I use it here, means that people represent the group 
of which they form part or that they represent others whom they are entitled 
to represent because of a direct and personal relationship with this person or 
group of people. As well as victims, other groups, such as political parties or 
religious communities, can also be represented in a direct way in the commis-
sion. Some commissions pursue representivity on this direct level, in the sense 
of the German model of a view from everywhere discussed above. When this 
is the case, the final composition of the commission also tells us something 
about how policymakers understand the conflict and how they see the society. 
To illustrate: in the Chilean commission only the political affiliations and ideas 
of the commissioners were taken into account to establish representativeness. 
The Chilean dictatorship had also affected indigenous groups; however, they 
were not represented. The South African TRC represented different political 
affiliations, but also different apartheid race categories and different religious 
beliefs. This seems to have been a more complete and realistic image of South 
African society. Thus, when representativeness is pursued, the selection of 
commissioners represents the social and political view on society of those who 
select them. Consequently, the commission’s research will be conducted and 
the report will be written within the framework set by those pre-selections. 
I now argue that truth commissions also contain members who represent 
the relevant parties in an indirect way. Indirect representation, in the way 
used here, implies that the members of a commission represent individuals 
or groups of people of which they are not a member or which they do not 
personally know. Some commissioners have professions, backgrounds or 
characteristics that help them to represent the parties involved. For example, 
psychologists, those who have worked with victims or those with a general 
human rights background can be assumed to be qualified to communicate 
with and understand witnesses. Even when not personally involved, they are 
assumed to be good at understanding the parties involved and representing 
them in the commission. They can often, in fact, represent more than one party. 
Further, to be good representatives, the commissioners should also be able to 
explain complicated issues in a way that is understandable to a broad public. 
Members with a profession such as journalism or authors certainly contribute 
in this regard. Those who represent in indirect ways have the ability to conduct 
research in order to understand what happened. They collect documents and 
testimonies and transform the available information about the complex and 
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violent past into a report that makes it accessible and understandable to a broad 
public. They represent the different groups, by listening to them, by telling 
their stories (often in an indirect way) in the public report and through the 
formulation of recommendations for reparations for those wronged.
Although the commissioners might have good intentions, representation 
is never a completely transparent process. In his article ‘The Representative 
Claim’ (2006), Michael Saward speaks about an aesthetic moment in rep-
resentation: ‘There is an indispensable aesthetic moment in political representa-
tion because the represented is never just given, unambiguous, transparent. 
A representative – or someone making a representative claim – has necessarily 
to be creative. He or she has to mould, shape, and in one sense create that 
which is to be represented’ (Saward, 2006: 310). The idea of indirect rep-
resentation expects the commissioners to have the necessary creativity and 
insight to define not only what groups they should represent but also to define 
which aspects of the groups should be represented. The commission gives the 
groups they represent a voice to speak. At the same time, however, the claim 
of representation of the commissioners can also have a silencing effect on 
the represented (ibid.: 304). The commissioner, as a representative of certain 
groups, might appropriate their voices. 
Although the commissioners might strive to represent others in an objective 
way, they will always have their own ideas, opinions and values that, inevita-
bly, play a role in their decisions. They cannot fulfil the tasks related to their 
function as commissioners in a completely objective way, in the sense of being 
value-free.15 That is why not only the profile of the commissioner but also the 
composition of the commission is very important. A truth commission with 
a balanced composition might thus compensate for the (mild) biases of its 
individual members.
CONCLUSION
This chapter started from the observation that the commissioners of truth 
commissions seem to have divergent backgrounds. The questions ‘Why 
are the commissioners selected?’ and ‘Do they all fit a common epistemic 
profile?’ motivated the research presented in this chapter. The first part of the 
chapter argued that the differences in their compositions can be made intel-
ligible by referring to different ideals of objectivity. The objectivity claims 
made by the selection of the commissioners help to establish the authority of 
the commission. As a consequence, they are important for the reception of 
their future results. The second part of the chapter uncovered what kind of 
representative role the commissioners ought to play. In comparison with the 
members of the expert commissions of the EC (subject matter experts) and 
the jurors of the Assize court (laypeople and peers), the commissioners of 
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truth commissions have a different epistemic profile. First of all, they are not 
all subject matter experts. Some of them might have certain knowledge about 
the topic they investigate, but that is not the (only) reason why they form part 
of the commission. Others are clearly laypeople (non-experts). In the cases 
of El Salvador and South Africa, the non-expert character of the members 
even seems to be a deliberate choice. However, that does not mean that any 
layperson could have been included in the commission. The commissioners of 
truth commissions have complex tasks and responsibilities and they need to 
possess certain characteristics and capabilities relevant to these. A comparison 
of the professions and backgrounds of the commissioners of the cases made 
it possible to formulate a general epistemic profile consisting of three main 
characteristics: first, some of the commissioners are selected because of their 
authoritative status; second, the commissioners possess the necessary skills 
and capacities, such as research skills; and, third, the commissioners represent 
the involved parties, directly or indirectly. Direct representation means that 
the commissioners have a direct link with the person or group they represent. 
Indirect representation means that although the commissioners are not directly 
related to the parties involved, they possess specific characteristics that help 
to represent them. 
The analysis in this chapter draws on data from the truth commissions of 
Argentina, El Salvador, South Africa and Chile. As a consequence, I cannot 
argue that my analysis can be applied to all previous or future truth commis-
sions. Every transitional justice context is different. The selection of the com-
missioners has a great impact, not only on the report but also on the transitional 
context itself. There is not one right way to compose a commission and there 
are no strict guidelines to be followed, but concepts such as objectivity, author-
ity, status and representation seem to have an important bearing, independent 
of the commissions’ different political contexts. Answers to questions such as 
How can objectivity and authority be reached? Who has the right profile to 
form part of a commission and to represent the relevant groups? and Who are 
these relevant groups? will always depend on the context. This chapter has 
highlighted the importance of these concepts and ideas for policymakers, pre-
senting them as some aspects policymakers should take into account alongside 
other relevant factors. Reflection on the concepts might ideally lead to more 
awareness about the different factors and values at play, to deliberate decisions 
and to more transparency towards the public. 
Commissions are often presented as objective bodies, for example by their 
representative composition (German model) or by depicting a commission 
with a ‘view from nowhere’. However, I have shown in this chapter that 
neither those who select the commissioners nor the commissioners themselves 
can do their work in a completely objective way, in the sense of being free 
from all personal ideas, opinions and values (i.e. value-free objectivity). 
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Therefore, policymakers and commissioners should be aware of how their own 
backgrounds might influence the results of their work. Furthermore, the inabil-
ity to reach value-free objectivity on the personal level can be compensated for 
on the intersubjective level: objectivity can be approximated when agreement 
is achieved after a discussion among different members of a truth commission 
with a well-considered composition.16
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NOTES
1. Not only the selection of the commissioners is important, but the members of the 
investigation teams that support the work of the commission also have a crucial 
impact on the working of truth commissions and their results. My reasons for 
focusing on the commissioners, and not on the investigators, are threefold. First, 
besides their epistemic tasks, the commissioners of a truth commission have 
a clearly public role as well. This makes their profile more complex and impactful 
than that of the investigators. Second, the members of research teams are often 
selected by or in consultation with the commissioners (e.g. Argentina and Chile), 
so the selection of the latter influences the selection of the former. Third, gener-
ally, there is less information available about who the investigators are, and about 
how and why they were selected.
2. Chile has had three truth commissions in total. In this chapter I will only discuss the 
first commission created in 1990. In 2003, a second commission was established 
by President Ricardo Lagos: the National Commission for Political Imprisonment 
and Torture (Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión y Tortura or Valech I Commission), 
which was a commission with a different scope (Bacic and Stanley, 2005: 1). In 
2010, a third commission – the Valech II Commission – was established in order to 
compile a complete list of the victims of the human rights violations that had been 
investigated by the first two commissions.
3. The Ad Hoc Commission in El Salvador was tasked to investigate human rights 
violations committed by all top military officers during the war (Doggett and 
Kircher, 2005: 11; O’Shaughnessy and Dodson, 1999: 103).
4. Two of the 17 members, Dr Ramashala and Advocate de Jager, would resign 
before the commission’s report was handed over (Tutu, 1999: 68).
5. ‘The view from nowhere’ is an expression Jasanoff borrowed from the philoso-
pher Thomas Nagel.
6. The commissioners compared sources and assigned different degrees of certainty 
to the final conclusions of the cases. They differentiated between: overwhelming 
evidence (highly convincing evidence that supports the conclusion), substantial 
evidence (solid evidence that supports the conclusion), and sufficient evidence 
(when there is more supporting evidence than contradicting evidence) (United 
Nations, 1993: 21–2).
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7. In this chapter, I give the example of the Belgian jury system, which is partially 
different from jury systems in other countries such as the US. An important differ-
ence is that in the US, juries are involved in procedures in a variety of courts while 
in the Belgian judicial system, the jury is only involved in cases brought before 
the Assize court (Hof van Assisen – Cour d’Assises). Belgian law distinguishes 
three kinds of offence: misdaden (offences punishable with more than five years 
of imprisonment), wanbedrijven (offences punishable with imprisonment between 
eight days and five years and/or a fine), and overtredingen (offences punishable 
with imprisonment between one and seven days and/or a fine). The Assize court 
is officially responsible for misdaden (Traest, 2001: 27–8, see www .belgium 
.be). Political offences and offences perpetrated by means of the press can also be 
brought before the Assize court (Traest, 2001: 27–8). However, not all qualifying 
crimes are actually brought before the Assize court. Many of them are ‘correc-
tionalized’ so that the offence is artificially transformed to a less serious one that 
can be brought before the correctional court (correctionele rechtbank or tribunal 
correctionnel), which operates without a jury (Traest, 2001: 28).
8. People also can have other kinds of expertise. Some can be called experts based on 
their practical experience instead of their theoretical knowledge on a topic.
9. ‘Expert Groups Explained’, European Commission, accessed 31 March 2020 at 
http:// ec .europa .eu/ transparency/ regexpert/ index .cfm ?do = faq .faq & aide = 2
10. Definition from the online version of the Oxford English Dictionary.
11. The candidates on this final list all comply with five criteria: (1) entry in the 
voters’ register; (2) possession of civil and political rights; (3) literacy; (4) aged 
between 28 and 65; and (5) no conviction of more than four months’ prison time 
or more than 60 hours of community service (Federale Overheidsdienst – Justitie, 
2010: 6; Art. 213, Law of December 21, 2009). Some additional groups are 
excluded (see Art. 218, Law of December 21, 2009 for the list) and gender and 
education balances are taken into account.
12. Interestingly, they can also be seen as peers of the accused, although, the prin-
ciple of the jury in the Assize court is never explicitly described as the right of 
the accused to be tried by peers but as the right of the public to participate in the 
administration of justice (Traest, 2001: 28).
13. The complete list of professions excluded from jury service can be found in Art. 
218 of the Law of December 21, 2009.
14. The information on the backgrounds of the commissioners was collected from 
different sources; for Argentina: Bulygin and Stigol (2007), Cassini (2009), 
Crenzel (2012: 37–8), Inforegion (2009), Vanoli (2005); for Chile: Kritz (1995: 
463); for El Salvador: Americas Watch (1993: 8–9, 12), Mexico agreement (1991) 
– UN and El Salvador (1991: 263–72); for South Africa: Tutu (1999: 65–7), 
Verdoolaege (2005: 17).
15. Objectivity can be pursued in different ways. In her paper, ‘The Irreducible 
Complexity of Objectivity’, the philosopher Heather Douglas discusses eight 
operationally accessible and distinct senses of objectivity; value-free objectivity is 
one of them (2004: 462–4).
16. This is what Heather Douglas calls ‘intersubjective objectivity’ (2004: 462–4).
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